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Abstract. Modern information society depends on reliable functionality of information systems 
infrastructure, while at the same time the number of cyber-attacks has been increasing over the years 
and damages have been caused. Furthermore, graphs can be used to show paths than can be exploited 
by attackers to intrude into systems and gain unauthorized access through vulnerability exploitation. 
This paper presents a method that builds attack graphs using data supplied from the maritime supply 
chain infrastructure. The method delivers all possible paths that can be exploited to gain access. Then, 
a recommendation system is utilized to make predictions about future attack steps within the network. 
We show that recommender systems can be used in cyber defense by predicting attacks. The goal of 
this paper is to identify attack paths and show how a recommendation method can be used to classify 
future cyber-attacks in terms of risk management. The proposed method has been experimentally 
evaluated and validated, with the results showing that it is both practical and effective. 
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1. Introduction 
Recommender systems are decision support systems available on the web to assist users in the 
selection of item or service selection in online domains. In doing so recommender systems assist users 
in overcoming the information overload problem (Lu, Wu, Mao, Wang, & Zhang, 2015; Polatidis & 
Georgiadis, 2013). Collaborative filtering (CF) is the most widely used method for providing 
personalized recommendations. In CF systems, a database of user submitted ratings is used and the 
generated recommendations are generated on how much a user will like an unrated item based on 
previous common rated items. Thus, the recommendation process is based on assumptions about 
previous rating agreements and if these agreements will be maintained in the future. In addition, the 
ratings are used to create an n x m matrix with user ids, item ids and ratings, with an example of such 
a matrix shown in table 1. This database has four users and four items with values from 1 to 5. The 
matrix is used as input when a user is requesting recommendations and for a recommendation to be 
generated the degree of similarity between the user who makes the request and the other users’ needs 
to be predicted using a similarity function such as the Pearson Correlation Similarity (PCC) (Su & 
Khoshgoftaar, 2009). At the next step, a user neighborhood which consists of users having the highest 
degree of similarity is created with the requester. Finally, a prediction is generated after computing the 
average values of the nearest neighborhood ratings about an item, resulting in a recommendation list 
of items with the highest predicted rating values. 
 
Table 1. An Example of a Ratings Matrix 
 Item 1 Item 2 Item 3 Item 4 
User 1 1 2 5 - 
User 2 4 5 4 1 
User 3 - - 3 2 
User 4 1 1 2 5 
 
 
 
Even though, recommender systems have been used for product or service recommendation, in the 
current era where cyber-attacks have been increasing we show that they can be useful in attack 
prediction as well. In networks is important to be able to identify potential attacks made by local or 
network-based attackers and prevent them. Moreover, cyber-attackers tend to exploit vulnerabilities 
within a network and form attack paths from one asset to another until they have reached the asset 
they wish to harm. Recommender systems is a technology that has been used mostly in e-Commerce 
for product recommendation but can also be used in cyber-security to predict how an attacker might 
move within a network after a vulnerability has been exploited. Furthermore, it is a fact that among 
assets there exist common or similar vulnerabilities and a recommender system can be used to identify 
such similarities. 
 
1.1 Problem definition and contributions 
Cyber-attack prevention methods are based on graph analysis to identify attack paths or use previous 
attacker knowledge in combination with intrusion alerts to provide defense actions in real time. A gap 
is identified in attack prediction which can be solved with the use of suitable technologies. We have 
made the following contributions: 
 
1. We identify all attack paths in a graph according to constraints. 
2. We use the attack paths in combination with common vulnerability data to predict future 
attacks. 
3. We use real data and a risk management system for the maritime supply chain IT 
infrastructure for the evaluation where we show that the method is both practical and 
effective. 
 
1.2 Paper structure 
In section 2 relevant background work is analyzed. In section 3 the proposed method is explained. 
Section 4 presents the experimental evaluation of the attack path discovery method, Section 5 is the 
evaluation of the attack prediction method, Section 6 is the discussion and section 7 contains the 
conclusions and future work parts. 
 
 
2. Background 
 
2.1 Attack graph generation and analysis 
Cyber-attack prevention technologies typically use attack graph generation and analysis methods to 
identify all possible paths that attackers can exploit to gain unauthorized access to a system (Ou & 
Singhal, 2011). There are numerous methods available for attack graph generation and analysis. In 
(Templeton & Levitt, 2000) the authors use a general graph model, which is based on the JIGSAW 
specification language. Sample attack scenarios are created using different methods such as 
substitution, distribution and looping. In (Ning & Xu, 2003) the authors developed an intrusion 
correlator for intrusion alerts, which produces correlation graphs as output. Then, they use these 
graphs to create attack strategy graphs. The authors in (Ritchey & Ammann, 2000) utilize modeling 
based approach that is used to perform an analysis of the security of the network. This is done using 
model checking tools and a model is presented that describes the vulnerability to attack of the 
network. In (Sheyner, Haines, Jha, Lippmann, & Wing, 2002) the authors developed a tool called 
NuSMV, a Network Symbolic Model checker. This is a model checking tool that implements an 
algorithm for automatic generation of attack graphs. A logic-based approach is proposed in (Xinming 
Ou, Wayne F. Boyer, 2006). In this approach, the authors use logic rules to compute the attack graph 
and use logic deduction to reach the final facts from the initial facts. Although, this approach suffers 
from performance issues as the state grows. In (Ammann, Wijesekera, & Kaushik, 2002) a Breadth-
first search solution is used by the authors to build the attack graph. A layered solution is proposed 
where the bottom layer contains attacker privileges and the upper layer contains the privileges 
computer after each step of the algorithm. Once again, as the size of the graph grows there are 
performance issues. In (Ammann, Pamula, Ritchey, & Street, 2005) the authors propose an algorithm 
that only creates a graph containing the worst case scenarios. This approach performs better in terms 
of performance, but it cannot guarantee that all relevant paths will be returned. In (Ingols, Lippmann, 
& Piwowarski, 2006) the authors try to reduce complexity by introducing the concept of group 
reachability. This method uses a breadth first method and uses prerequisite graphs that express 
reachability conditions among network hosts. The authors in (Ingols, Chu, Lippmann, Webster, & 
Boyer, 2009) develop further the prerequisite graphs by adding information about client-side attacks, 
firewalls and intrusion detection. In (Kaynar & Sivrikaya, 2016) the authors use a distributed attack 
graph generation algorithm based on a multi-agent system, a virtual shared memory abstraction and 
hyper-graph partitioning to improve the overall performance of the system. The method is based on 
depth first search and it is shown that the performance is improved with the use of agents after a 
specific graph size. In (Xie, Zhang, Hu, & Chen, 2009) the authors use a bidirectional search method 
to generate the attack graph. They also apply a restriction about the depth of the search, which limits 
the algorithm from identifying less possible attacks. In (Ghosh & Ghosh, 2012) an approach that is 
based on artificial intelligence with the name Planner is applied to generate the attack graph. 
Customized algorithms are used to generate attack paths in polynomial time. In (Phillips & Swiler, 
1998) the authors propose a graph-based approach to analyze vulnerabilities, that can analyze risk to a 
specific asset and examine possible consequence of an attack. In (Almohri, Watson, Yao, & Ou, 
2016) the use of a probabilistic model is proposed. This model measures risk security, computes risk 
probability and considers dynamic network features. A somewhat different approach is proposed by 
the authors in (Bi, Han, & Wang, 2016). The use of dynamic generation algorithm is proposed, that 
returns the top K paths. Furthermore, it is not required to calculate the full attack graph to return the 
top attack paths. NetSPA is a network security planning architecture that very efficiently generates the 
worst case attack graphs (Artz, 2002). To do this the system uses information from software types and 
versions, intrusion detection systems, network connectivity and firewalls. In (Poolsappasit, Dewri, & 
Ray, 2012) the use Bayesian attack graph generation for dynamic security risk management. In (Ou, 
Govindavajhala, & Appel, 2005) the authors developed  Multi-host, Multi-stage Vulnerability 
Analysis Language (MulVAL), a logic-based network security analyzer. This is a vulnerability 
analysis tool that models the interaction of software bugs along with network configurations. The data 
about the software bugs are provided by a bug-reporting community, while all the other relevant 
information is enclosed within the system. In addition to MulVAL, Topological Vulnerability analysis 
(TVA) is another tool for generating attack graphs (Jajodia, Noel, & O’Berry, 2005; Ou & Singhal, 
2011). TVA is based on topological analysis of network attack vulnerability and the idea is to exploit 
dependency graph to represent preconditions and postconditions and then exploit. At the next step, a 
search algorithm finds attack paths that exploit multiple vulnerabilities.  
 
 
2.2 Collaborative filtering 
As explained above a database of ratings and a similarity function such as PCC are the two essential 
parts of the CF recommendation process. Except for the classical recommendation method, PCC, 
another similar method found in the literature is weighted PCC (WPCC) which extends PCC by 
setting a statically defined threshold of common rated items. However, since the definitions of PCC 
and WPCC numerous approaches have been proposed with the aim of improving the 
recommendations. TasteMiner  is a method that efficiently mines rating for learning partial users 
tastes to restrict the neighborhood size, thus reducing complexity and improving the accuracy of the 
recommendations (Shams & Haratizadeh, 2017). Another CF approach that aims to improve the 
accuracy of the recommendations is entropy based can be found in the literature. In this approach an 
entropy driven similarity used to calculate the difference between ratings and a Manhattan distance 
model is then used to address the fat tail problem (Wang, Zhang, & Lu, 2015). One more similarity 
measure for improving the accuracy of CF has been proposed with the name PIP. This measurement is 
based on Proximity, Impact and Popularity (PIP). Initially the proximity factor is applied to calculate 
the absolute difference between two ratings, then the impact factor is applied to show how strongly an 
item is preferred and finally the popularity factor is applied to how common the user ratings are. 
These three factors are then combined to calculate a final value  (Liu, Hu, Mian, Tian, & Zhu, 2014). 
HU-FCF  is a hybrid fuzzy CF method for improved recommendations (Son, 2014). In this method, 
CF is extended with a fuzzy similarity that is calculated on user demographic data. A CF 
recommendation method based on singularities has been proposed (Bobadilla, Ortega, & Hernando, 
2012). In this method, the traditional similarities can be improved if contextual information from the 
entire user body are used to calculate singularities. Thus, the larger the singularity between users then 
the impact of it in the similarity is larger. Additionally, the use or power law augments to similarity 
values can be found in the literature with the name PLUS (M. Gan & Jiang, 2013). PLUS, is a method 
applied to user similarities to adjust their value using a power function and achieves a tradeoff 
between accuracy and diversity of the recommendations. Yet another approach for improved 
recommendations is the use of Pareto dominance (Ortega, Sánchez, Bobadilla, & Gutiérrez, 2013). 
Pareto dominance is used initially as a pre-filtering service were the less promising users are 
eliminated from the user neighborhood. Then, the rest are used in a typical CF recommendation 
process. An additional recommendation approach includes the breakup of the user neighborhood in 
multiples levels (Polatidis & Georgiadis, 2016). This can be done either using a static approach  or a 
dynamic one (Polatidis & Georgiadis, 2016, 2017). In both approaches the user similarities are 
adjusted either in a positive or a negative way based on the number of co-rated items and the PCC 
values and are assigned to one of multiple levels based on the final computed value. Thus, the 
predictions are made using the new user neighborhood and the recommendations are improved. An 
additional method that can be used to improve the quality of the recommendations is natural noise 
removal (Toledo, Mota, & Martínez, 2015). Items and users are characterized based on their profiles 
and a defined strategy is used to eliminate natural noise, thus receiving more accurate 
recommendations. Also, other traditional approaches exist that can be used to improve CF and include 
the use of content-boosted CF or the utilization of sparsity measures (Anand & Bharadwaj, 2011; 
Melville, Mooney, & Nagarajan, 2002). COUSIN  is a recommendation model that improves both the 
accuracy and the diversity of the recommendations by using a regression model that effectively 
removes weak user relationships (M. Gan, 2016). There is also an approach in the literature called 
Trinity  that uses historical data and tags to provide personalized recommendations based on a three-
layered object-user tag network (M.-X. Gan, Sun, & Jiang, 2016). In addition to the methods 
mentioned already the use of user-item subgroups has been proposed as a way of providing improved 
recommendation systems (Xu, Bu, Chen, & Cai, 2012). 
 
2.3 Combination of attack graph analysis and collaborative filtering for attack prediction 
In sections 2.1 and 2.2 related works regarding attack graph analysis and collaborative filtering 
methods have been explained. In section 2.1 related works about graph analysis have been analysed 
due to the fact that analysing a graph and identifying possible attack paths is the first path of the attack 
path recommendation process. In section 2.2 related works about collaborative filtering 
recommendation methods have been analysed to identify the most relevant ones that can be used for 
attack prediction. The related works have been analysed in order to identify the most relevant attack 
graph analysis method and the most relevant recommendation method. We have most suitable 
methods from both categories that have the most features. For attack graph analysis a method has 
been selected that satisfies criteria such as the location and the knowledge of the attacker and supports 
pruning of paths. On the other hand collaborative filtering is the most suitable method since it 
provides a reliable method for identifying similar vulnerabilities. Furthermore, multi-level 
collaborative filtering works better when the similar vulnerabilities have very similar characteristics, 
since it considers the common similar vulnerabilities except the similarity values derived from similar 
vulnerabilities. 
 
3. Proposed method 
Our proposed method takes elements from both collaborative filtering recommender systems and 
attack path discovery methods to identify attacks paths and predict attacks. Initially, we use an attack 
path discovery method that has unique characteristics, such as the attacker location, the attacker 
capability and which the entry and target points are (Polatidis, Pavlidis, & Mouratidis, 2018; Polatidis, 
Pimenidis, Pavlidis, & Mouratidis, 2017). The attack path discovery method returns all non-circular 
attack paths that exist between assets that belong to the specified characteristics.   
 
 
3.1 Attack path discovery 
Attackers can use a set of basic privileges that can satisfy some initial input requirements to gain 
unauthorized access to a system. Attack graphs show every possible path that an attacker can use to 
gain further privileges (Barik & Mazumdar, 2014; Ou & Singhal, 2011). In general, various 
vulnerabilities, such as software vulnerabilities or inappropriate configuration settings, exist in 
information systems and can be exploited by attackers to gain access. An infrastructure it typically 
comprised of numerous nodes that can be exploited to intrude into the network. In addition, the 
number of vulnerabilities that exist on the network and the reachability conditions that occur are the 
factors that determine the size of the attack graph. In, addition as the graph becomes larger, the 
possibility of more exploitation options for an attacker increases. To build the attack graph we use 
direct conditions and utilize information from open sources. Initially, the weaknesses defined in the 
Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) (“CWE,” n.d.) are used, and at the second step, Information 
from the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) (“CVE,” n.d.) database are used. A model is 
introduced where an attacker can gain access to information system sources and move in a directed 
path. Moreover, a set of preconditions are specified, which include the length of the path, the location 
and capability of the attacker.  
 
The pseudocode of the attack path discovery is shown in algorithm 1, while the following activities 
need to be executed for the algorithm to identify the attack paths, while the term business partners 
refer to partners of a supply chain in the maritime sector: 
 
 
1. Activity 1: Entry Points Identification: The Business Partners have to define the Entry 
Points (assets from which the attacks will be initiated; these assets are considered as more 
reachable by an attacker). Moreover, the business partners should be experts with an 
information technology (IT) and security background and be know the infrastructure.  
2. Activity 2: Target Points Identification: The Business Partners must define the Target 
Points (the assets which are considered as target for attacks due to their criticality).  
3. Activity 3: Identify Attacker Profile: Attacker profiles will be identified by their location 
and their expertise. Their location is represented by the values 1, 2 and 3 (local, adjacent and 
network). Their expertise is represented by the values 1, 2 and 3 (low, medium and high). In 
algorithm 1 the variables ‘attacker location’ and ‘attacker capability’ takes values from 1 to 3. 
4. Activity 4: Generate Vulnerability Chains: This step follows a rule-based reasoning 
approach (filters) to generate the chain of sequential vulnerabilities on different assets that 
arise from consequential multi-steps attacks initiated from the Entry Points to exploit the 
vulnerabilities of the Target Points. 
 
  
 
Algorithm 1: Attack path discovery 
Input: Asset graph (G), attacker location, attacker capability 
Output: Graph, affected assets, attack paths 
#We create two empty lists to hold attack paths and assets 
attackpaths = [] affectedassets = [] 
#We return all paths from source to target 
for e in parameters entry points 
If (attacker location < required level of attacker location 
/*explain attacker location  
OR attacker capability < required attacker capability) 
/*explain attacker capability 
return empty graph 
else if 
(attacker location >= required level of attacker location  
OR attacker capability >= required attacker capability) 
AND  
(vulnerability type == Code execution 
OR vulnerability type == Code overflow 
OR vulnerability type == XSS 
OR vulnerability type == Bypass something 
OR vulnerability type == Obtain privilege 
OR vulnerability type == Memory corruption) 
get single source shortest path length  
set propagation length for entry point e 
for target point t 
#Create a list with all non-circular paths from entry e to target t 
get all paths in the graph G from entry e to target t that are up to the pre-specified path length 
 for the size of paths found 
  add paths to attackpaths [] list, add affected assets to affectedassets [] list 
#Return the graph, the affected assets and the attack paths found as a direct input to  
#the attack visualization algorithm 
return Graph, affected assets, attack paths 
 
 
3.2 Attack prediction 
To recommend attack predictions we use a parameterized version of multi-level collaborative filtering 
method described in (Polatidis & Georgiadis, 2016), although other methods could be applied 
according the scenario and the available data. This method applies collaborative filtering and then 
rearranges the order of the k nearest neighbors according to the similarity value and the number of co-
rated items. We use characteristics from the above-mentioned method to classify attacks. To do that 
we initially apply classical collaborative filtering using PCC defined in equation 1. In PCC Sim (a, b) 
is the similarity of users a and b, ra,p is the rating of user a for product p, rb,p is the rating of user b for 
product p and 𝑟´𝑟, 𝑟´𝑟 represent user's average ratings. P is the set of all products. At the next step, 
we check the similarity values returned by equation 1 and the number of co-rated vulnerabilities. 
Depending on the similarity value returned and the common vulnerabilities, we classify these attacks 
from very high to very low. Finally, we check if there are any attack paths between the assets before 
the classification process is finished. A detailed explanation of the steps can be found in algorithm 2 
which provides the pseudocode of the attack prediction recommender system. Finally, it should be 
mentioned that classical collaborative filtering without any other parameters could be used but this 
could raise issues when many common vulnerabilities exist between assets due to the fact of a high 
returned similarity value. 
 
 
𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑟,𝑟 =
∑ 𝑟 ∈ 𝑟(𝑟𝑟,𝑟 − 𝑟´𝑟)(𝑟𝑟,𝑟 − 𝑟´𝑟)
√∑ 𝑟 ∈ 𝑟(𝑟𝑟,𝑟 − 𝑟´𝑟)2√∑ 𝑟 ∈ 𝑟(𝑟𝑟,𝑟 − 𝑟´𝑟)2
(1) 
 
 Algorithm 2: Attack prediction 
Input: attack paths, affected assets, vulnerabilities 
Output: predicted attacks 
#Vulnerabilities refers to common vulnerabilities between assets 
load vulnerabilities (CVEs) 
load vulnerability types (CWEs) 
apply equation 1 using vulnerabilities as input 
get similarity values  
#If there are common vulnerabilities, then typically these receive the same score  
#between assets, thus, resulting in absolute similarities 
#Then we rearrange the order of the similarity by adding the number of co-rated items as a constraint 
#classification refers to predicted attack classification, which is from very high to very low 
then #n represents the number of co-rated items and x1, x2, x3 and x4 are fixed integers 
 if n>=x1 && vulnerability belongs to the same type then classification == very high 
else if (n<x1 && n>=x2) vulnerability belongs to the same type && then 
classification == high 
  else if n<x2 && n>=x3 then classification == Medium 
  else if n<x3 && n>=x4 then classification == Low 
 else classification == very low 
then 
 get attack paths 
  if attack path exists 
   set classification == very high 
else if attack path does not exist && classification == very high then classification == high 
  else classification == classification 
Return predicted attacks 
 
 
4. Attack path generation evaluation 
The experiments took place in a simulated environment using a Pentium i7 2.8 GHz with 12 gigabytes 
of RAM, running windows 10. Section 4.1 represents the performance evaluation, while section 4.2 
provides a comparison with other methods. 
 
4.1 Performance evaluation 
This section presents the performance evaluation of the attack graph generation algorithm, with the 
results presented in table 2 and figure 1. To examine the performance and feasibility of the proposed 
attack paths generation approach to identify and calculate all the possible attack patterns, we will use 
the Port’s Services Requested Supply Chain sub process of the “vehicles transport service”, which is a 
part of the supply chain that includes a number of assets regarding this service only. The “Port’s 
Services Requested” sub-process aims to illustrate the interactions among the Port Authority, the Ship 
Agent and the Customs to request services for the vessel’s arrival or departure. Manifest Registration 
Number (MRN) is required in the current sub-process to precede with these tasks and includes assets 
regarding this service of the supply chain only. The Ship Agent submits the Manifest Registration 
Number (MRN) received from the Customs to the Port Authority requesting services for the vessel 
such as, mooring, lacing, assigning risk assessment processes weather conditions, navigational 
warnings, procedures for communication failure, fenders, personnel (truckers for transferring the 
vehicles from the Industry to storage area, etc.). This process is performed via the Port Community 
System (PCS) that is an electronic platform which connects the multiple systems operated by a variety 
of organizations involved in the port’s supply chain. This system facilitates the secure and efficient 
electronic exchange of information between the public and private stakeholders and allows the 
automatization and the smooth operation of the port and logistics processes through a single request 
submission. It should be noted that about 180 cyber assets (35 hardware assets and 145 software 
assets) with different product characteristics and technical specifications (such as product version, 
vendor) as well as with several associated confirmed Vulnerabilities and flaws (including CVE’s, 
CVSS data, vulnerability type or vulnerability details) identified that are necessary to support the 
provision of the process. 
 
Table 2.  Performance evaluation results 
No. of test 
Attacker 
Capability 
Propagation 
length 
No of entry 
points 
No of target 
points 
Running 
time 
1 Low 3 5 5 <1 
2 Low 4 5 5 <1 
3 Low 5 5 5 <1 
4 Medium 3 5 5 <1 
5 Medium 4 5 5 <1 
6 Medium 5 5 5 1 
7 High 3 5 5 <1 
8 High 4 5 5 1 
9 High 5 5 5 1.2 
10 High 3 25 25 1.35 
11 High 5 25 25 1.50 
12 High 10 25 25 1.95 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Performance evaluation based on 180 assets  
 
4.2 Attack graph generation algorithm comparison with other methods 
The proposed method has been compared with the following long established and state-of-the-art 
alternatives. The first two are the most relevant and well-established methods found in the literature, 
while the following two are the most relevant state-of-the-art similar methods found in the literature. 
The methods have been selected due to the fact that are the most relevant and can be used for risk 
management. Moreover, the selected methods include both traditional and state-of-the-art approaches 
that satisfy most of the criteria discussed in section 4.2.1 and appendix A, while none of these 
alternatives satisfies the criteria as a whole. 
 
1. Long established methods 
 (Sheyner, Haines, Jha, Lippmann, & Wing, 2002 ). 
This is a model checking tool that implements an algorithm for automatic generation 
of attack graphs with the name NuSMV. 
 (Jajodia et al., 2005; Ou & Singhal, 2011). 
This is a tool named TVA that is based on topological analysis of network attack 
vulnerabilities and the idea is to exploit a dependency graph to represent 
preconditions and postconditions and then exploit them. At the next step, a search 
algorithm finds attack paths that exploit multiple vulnerabilities. 
 
2. State-of-the-art 
 (Kaynar & Sivrikaya, 2016). 
This method uses a distributed attack graph generation algorithm based on a multi-
agent system, a virtual shared memory abstraction and hyper-graph partitioning to 
improve the overall performance of the system. 
 (Bi, Han, & Wang, 2016 ). 
The use of dynamic generation algorithm is proposed in this method and returns the 
top K paths. 
 
 
4.2.1 Evaluation criteria 
17 criteria have been identified and used for evaluating the quality of the algorithm. The selection was 
based on algorithm characteristics found on previous studies and current trends in risk management 
(Kaynar & Sivrikaya, 2016; Lever & Kifayat, 2016; Polatidis et al., 2018; Yi et al., 2013). The details, 
of the criteria can be found in appendix A, while the criteria are also presented briefly within table 3. 
 
 
4.2.2 Evaluation results 
The results of the comparison are presented in table 3, where it is shown which of the criteria are 
satisfied by each method. 
 
 
Table 3.  Comparison results 
Criteria 
Attack graph generation methods 
(Sheyner, 
Haines, Jha, 
Lippmann, & 
Wing, 2002 ) 
(Jajodia et al., 
2005; Ou & 
Singhal, 2011) 
(Kaynar & 
Sivrikaya, 
2016) 
(Bi, Han, & 
Wang, 2016 
 
Proposed 
method 
1 
(Attack Path 
Analysis) 
√ √ √ √ √ 
2 
(Vulnerability 
Chain 
Analysis) 
× √ √ × √ 
3 
(Integration of 
Open Source 
Information) 
× √ √ √ √ 
4 
(Integration of 
Crowd 
Sourcing 
Information) 
× × × × √ 
5 
(Collaboration 
Capabilities) 
× × √ × √ 
6 √ √ × × √ 
(Support tool) 
7 
(Tool 
availability) 
√ × × × √ 
8 
(Pruning of 
paths) 
× × √ √ √ 
9 
(Propagation 
length) 
× × × √ √ 
10 
(Attacker 
location) 
× √ √ √ √ 
11 
(Attacker 
capability) 
× √ √ √ √ 
12 
(Entry points) 
× × × × √ 
13 
(Target Points 
× × × × √ 
14 
(Satisfaction 
of EU 
policies) 
× × × × √ 
15 
(Can be used 
for risk 
assessment) 
× × √ × √ 
16 
(Vulnerability 
types) 
× √ √ √ √ 
17 
(Clarity and 
replication) 
× √ √ √ √ 
 
 
The main goal of the attack path discovery method is to identify the attack paths in specified network 
fragments of the maritime supply chain infrastructure and use them for risk management. 
Furthermore, the attack path discovery method includes the satisfaction of the following important 
components, that the related works fail to address as a whole:  
1. Capability and location of the attacker. 
2. Propagation length. 
3. Entry and target points. 
4. Pruning of paths 
5. Satisfaction of EU policies 
 
 
5 Attack prediction algorithm evaluation 
The maritime supply chain infrastructure it typically comprised of numerous assets that can be 
exploited to gain access and reach specific assets by popping from one to another. For the case study, 
we have used a snippet of data derived from the Valencia port IT infrastructure. In table 4 the data 
used show the common vulnerabilities between assets and their respective score. Assets 1, 2 and 3 are 
hardware assets, while the description column represents the vulnerable software asset that is installed 
on the respective hardware asset. Furthermore, the assets and attacks paths between them are a vital 
part of risk assessment. The following non-circular attack paths are present in the system: 
 
Asset1 → Asset2 
Asset2 → Asset3 
Asset2 → Asset1 
 
However, it should be noted that attack paths might vary according to the specific settings used, such 
as the propagation length, attacker location, capability, entry and target points. 
 
Table 4.  Common vulnerabilities 
Assets Description 
CVE 
2015-1769 
CVE 
2015-
2423 
CVE 
2015-2433 
CVE 
2015-2485 
Asset 1 
(Desktop 
PC) 
Windows 
10 Installed 
on Desktop 
PC 
10 2.9 2.9 10 
Asset 2 
(Laptop 
1) 
Windows 
10 Installed 
on Laptop 1 
10 2.9 2.9 10 
Asset 3 
(Laptop 
2) 
Windows 
10 Installed 
on Laptop 2 
10 2.9 2.9 - 
 
 
 
Then the administrator executed algorithm 2 to predict very high and high classification attacks. 
Moreover, for the case study we have assigned the minimum number of co-rated items to be 3 for 
very high classification and 2 for high classification. Thus, algorithm 2 classified: 
 
1. Asset1 → Asset2 as very high  
2. Asset2 → Asset1 as very high 
3. Asset1 → Asset3 as high 
4. Asset3 → Asset1 as high  
5. Asset2 → Asset3 as high 
6. Asset3 → Asset2 as high 
 
At the next step, the method checked for attack path relations between the assets and rearranged the 
classifications. Thus, the administrator received the following final predictions:  
 
1. Asset1 → Asset2 as very high 
2. Asset2 → Asset1 as very high 
3. Asset2 → Asset3 as very high 
4. Asset1 → Asset3 as high 
5. Asset3 → Asset1 as high 
6. Asset3 → Asset2 as high 
 
 
5.1 Expert validation 
For the validation of the attack prediction method, the opinions of five experts have been gathered for 
the validity of each of the six predictions and how these should be classified. The outcome of the 
attack prediction method has been validated separately by each of the experts, while they had access 
to the database with the assets and the CVE vulnerabilities. The experts were selected among people 
from the business partners and had to be experts in IT with internal knowledge of the system. 
 
The following comments where received by the experts: 
1. A path between assets with vulnerabilities that are the same or that belong to the same CWE 
category are more important and should be classified as very high. This validates the fact that 
paths 1 to 3 are classified as very high. 
2. Agreed that paths 4 to 6 are of high importance at least. 
 
All five experts that although it is important to predict moves within a network, is also important to 
know that a true expert will try to exploit every possible vulnerability and movie within after 
exploiting any other possible vulnerability, according to the type of access the attacker wants. 
Furthermore, the experts agreed that when an attacker exploits a certain vulnerability then at the next 
step they would try to exploit either the same vulnerability or a vulnerability of the same type. While, 
at the same time three out of the five experts mentioned that they would try to identify if they could 
exploit a vulnerability that would cause a higher damage to the system and then other that would 
cause lesser damage. Finally, all agreed it is vital to have a tool that can make importance predictions, 
then further evaluate with experts the predictions and provide mitigation solutions accordingly. 
 
  
6 Discussion 
Risk management is important for identifying risks in networks and propose mitigation solutions. 
Typically, risk management systems rely on the use of attack graph generation methods to identify 
attack paths and perform risk assessments. Although, in the literature there are several attack graph 
generation methods there aren’t any that satisfy plenty criteria to make the process straightforward 
and produce results of higher quality. In the literature there are long established methods such as the 
ones in (Sheyner et al., 2002) and (Jajodia et al., 2005) that can be used for attack graph generation. 
However, these methods being old and have been carefully examined in an experimental setting show 
that do not support several characteristics required for risk assessment such as pruning of paths and 
the location and capability of a potential attacker. On the other hand there are state-of-the-art methods 
such as the one in (Kaynar & Sivrikaya, 2016) and (Bi, Han, & Wang, 2016 ) that satisfy many more 
of the criteria necessary for risk assessment but several modifications would be necessary for them to 
be used. Thus, a new method for attack graph generation in terms of risk management was necessary 
and has been developed. The proposed attack graph generation method performs well in terms of 
performance as shown in the outputs in table 2 and in figure 1. Moreover, it satisfied all seventeen 
identified criteria, which will make the process of risk assessment and mitigation straightforward. 
Furthermore, cyber-attack prediction systems are important in risk management to provide mitigation 
solutions. To do that the identification of possible attack scenarios and providing defensive solutions 
for assets protection are the two most important parts. Furthermore, it is important for this to take 
place within a reasonable amount of time. It is shown that within a small amount of time the attack 
path discovery method delivers the non-circular attack paths between assets. Furthermore, at the next 
stage a classification list is created that provides a prediction list of attack movement between assets. 
For example, the likelihood that an attacker who gained access to asset 1 to explore the possibility of 
gaining access to asset 4 is higher when compared to gaining access to either asset 2 or asset 3. 
However, the possibility of common vulnerabilities receiving different scores in different assets 
should be further exploited since this will result in different classification scales. 
 
 
7. Conclusions and future work 
Recommender systems have been used extensively in various on-line services for product or service 
recommendation. However, until this point the use of such systems for predicting cyber-attacks has 
not been explored. In this paper we provide an in depth analysis of why cyber-attack prediction is 
important and how attack graph analysis can be combined with a collaborative filtering based 
approach to predict attacks within a risk management system. The proposed method combines attack 
graph analysis and recommendation technologies. Initially, a network is analyzed and a graph 
containing relevant attack paths is produced and on the next step multi-level collaborative filtering is 
used to predict how an attacker could move after access is gained to any of the assets. Furthermore, 
both parts of the proposed method have been evaluated for performance and quality. While, the 
method is practical, it could become more effective if certain aspects are extended, thus in the future 
we aim to investigate the following research directions:  
Path length recommendation. We aim to apply recommendation techniques to dynamically identify 
the length of the path that should be searched, thus making the attack path discovery process faster. 
Cyber-attack prediction. We aim to further develop our recommendation based attack prediction 
algorithm using classification methods such as Naïve Bayes and random forests. 
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Appendix A Evaluation criteria 
 
 
1. Attack Path Analysis. 
➢ This describes the capacity of the evaluated method to identify and analyses different attack 
paths. We are distinguishing the following main types. 
 
2. Vulnerability Chain Analysis. 
➢ This describes the capacity of the methods to identify chains of sequential vulnerabilities on 
different assets and include them into the risk analysis. We are distinguishing the following 
main types. 
 
3. Integration of Open Source Information. 
➢ This describes the capacity of the evaluated method to retrieve and integrated information 
coming from openly accessible sources of information (e.g., open source databases). 
 
4. Integration of Crowd Sourcing Information. 
➢ This describes the capacity of the evaluated method to retrieve and integrated information 
coming from crowd sourcing (e.g., technical forums). 
 
5. Collaboration Capabilities. 
➢ This describes the capacity of the evaluated method to enable and utilize the collaboration of 
several users in the risk analysis or risk management process. 
 
6. Supporting tool. 
➢ If there is a tool for providing a visual representation or any other relevant form of the results. 
 
7. Tool availability. 
➢ If the tool is available to the public to download, use or modify. 
 
8. Pruning of paths. 
➢ Pruning of paths makes algorithm more efficient. The algorithm can cut paths that either not 
important or fall in a category that we are not interested in, such as networked attacks. 
 
9. Propagation length. 
➢ The propagation length can be specified. The user should be able to enter the length that a 
potential attacker could reach after gaining access to an entry asset. 
 
10. Attacker location. 
➢ The location of the attacker can be specified. The location of the attacker can be specified, 
and it should be either local or networked. 
 
11. Attacker capability. 
➢ The capability of the attacker can be specified. The capability should be specified in terms of 
high, medium, low or similar. 
 
12. Entry points. 
➢ The entry assets can be specified, which helps to search on specific network parts for 
problems. 
 
13. Target points. 
 The target assets can be specified, which helps to search on specific network parts for 
problems. 
 
14. Satisfaction of EU policies. 
➢ EU maritime supply chain policies are satisfied. 
 
15. Can be used for risk assessment. 
➢ This describes the applicability of the evaluated method for the maritime supply chain risk 
assessment area. 
 
16. Vulnerability types. 
➢ The types and the categories of the vulnerabilities can be specified within the settings of the 
algorithm. 
 
17. Clarity and replication. 
➢ The algorithm is presented in a manner that it makes it easy to replicate or extend. 
 
